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 1 
HOME DEFENCE AND THE SANDYS DEFENCE WHITE 
PAPER, 1957 
 
 
 
 
Long understood as the key document in Britain‟s cold war history, the 
Sandys Defence White Paper of 1957 nevertheless has a largely forgotten 
context: home defence.  This article argues that understanding this 
context allows important new conclusions to be drawn concerning the 
drafting, presentation and the reception of the document and the deterrent 
strategy it expounded.  It argues that the Paper failed to establish a new 
doctrine for civil defence which reconciled the policy with the wider 
deterrent strategy.  In doing this, the Paper presented a muddled policy to 
the public: one which failed to justify the reductions in civil defence 
provision but which stressed the destructive power of thermonuclear 
weapons.  This had the effect of encouraging the critics of the 
Government‟s nuclear strategy to flag the absence of adequate civil 
defence measures and highlight the „admission‟ that there was no defence 
against the hydrogen bomb. 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The Sandys White Paper was the key defence document in Britain‟s cold war history.  It 
was the pivot on which British policy turned.  Before 1957, a conscript army had 
continued from the Second World War to fulfil British defence commitments.  
Afterwards, Britain finally and fully embraced the doctrine of nuclear deterrence as the 
key organising concept of its defence posture.  This allowed widespread cuts: military 
personnel would be reduced from 690,000 to 625,000 within twelve months, and to 
375,000 by the end of 1962.
1
  The British commitment to Europe enshrined in the 
British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) was slashed, the surface fleet was cut back, and the 
strength of Fighter Command was reduced.  For a generation of young British men, 
Sandys called an end to National Service, ensuring that none would be compelled to 
undertake military service for the rest of the twentieth century.  Finally, Sandys‟ 
unambiguous commitment to the nuclear deterrent inspired a mass-movement which 
equally unambiguously rejected nuclear weapons and campaigned to have the British 
deterrent scrapped.   
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The importance of these four main strands (the heavy reduction in conventional military 
forces, the ending of conscription, the commitment to nuclear deterrence, and the 
fostering of anti-nuclear sentiment) varied greatly in the thinking of the Conservative 
Government in 1957, but have all been the subject of historical enquiry.  For example, 
rows about the cuts in conventional forces dominated the formulation of the White 
Paper with the Chiefs of Staff bitterly opposing the reductions.  The paper went through 
no less than thirteen „final‟ versions, and as Peter Hennessy has put it, „there was blood 
on every page‟.2  This aspect of Sandys has attracted a good deal of historical attention.3 
There are also widespread assumptions about the social consequences of ending 
conscription.  Writers on the 1960s have long since considered the point when the last 
National Servicemen left uniform a key cultural moment.  As Christopher Brooker put it 
in 1969, „the social consequences of the decision to place so much store by [the] 
“independent nuclear deterrent”… were in many ways to be even greater than its 
political and military repercussions‟.4   On the adoption of the doctrine of nuclear 
deterrence, the revolutionary nature of Sandys can be overstated.  British strategy had 
incorporated the notion of deterrence for some years.  It was pretty well fully articulated 
in the 1955 White Paper, for example, which argued that nuclear weapons brought not 
despair but hope.
5
  New in 1957 was the argument that a deterrent posture allowed 
concomitant reductions in conventional forces.  Again, the origins of the Sandys Paper‟s 
nuclear commitment has been mined in some important works.
6
 
 
Lastly, there are the political consequences of this deterrent doctrine; or perhaps it 
would be better described as the political consequences of the way in which this 
doctrine was announced.  It is a commonplace in the literature on the Campaign for 
Nuclear Disarmament to stress its origins in the Sandys White Paper‟s famous 
admission that „it must be frankly recognised that there is at present no means of 
providing adequate protection for the people of this country against the consequences of 
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an attack with nuclear weapons‟.7  Yet the reasons why such an admission was made 
have yet to be sufficiently probed: after all, a deterrent posture did not preclude the 
government continuing its previous argument that home defence would go a long way 
to mitigating the effects of nuclear attack.  The importance of this phraseology, both 
within the report and for its reception, can be seen in a fifth and neglected effect of the 
Sandys White Paper: the slashing of the civil and home defence budget by over 50%.   
 
The purpose of this article is to explore the home defence context of the Sandys White 
Paper.  It argues that „passive‟ defence against nuclear weapons is the White Paper‟s 
forgotten paradigm and had an enormous effect on how the wider policy of deterrence 
was framed and expounded.  The cuts in civil defence expenditure represented a 
revolutionary break with the pre-1957 policy of providing „survival measures‟ and 
required justification beyond the merely financial, and this was achieved by linking 
reduced provision to the new deterrent posture.  But despite the White Paper stressing 
the need for continued civil defence measures as an insurance, the Government‟s policy 
was swept away by the „admission‟ that there was no adequate defence against 
hydrogen bombs; moreover, the civil defence passages of the paper, culled of all policy 
announcements or even of existing measures, were certainly not strong enough to 
convince anyone that the Government believed in civil defence as a viable policy.  
Later, the admission would be seized upon by the disarmament movement as a stick 
with which to beat the deterrent policy itself.  Also, the home defence aspect of the 
Sandys White Paper sheds interesting new light on the report‟s formulation, and 
suggests that more emphasis should be placed on its pre-Suez origins than is currently 
the case.  While its role as post-Suez review is not in doubt, it is clear that much of the 
philosophy of the White Paper was thrashed out in the historiographically neglected 
1956 Policy Review conducted by the Eden Government.  By examining the role of 
civil defence in the Government‟s nuclear policy up until 1956, its reappraisal and 
downgrading in the Policy Review, and finally its justification in the Sandys White 
Paper and reception in the following eighteen months, a deeper understanding of the 
Government defence policy can be achieved and the origins and consequences of the 
Sandys White Paper more fully understood. 
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Civil and Home Defence, 1945-56 
Before Sandys, civil defence had commanded an important, if increasingly ambivalent, 
space in the cold war British state.  Its position owed much to the specific nature of 
weapons technology when the cold war began.  Having proved an indispensable part of 
the Second World War state machinery,
8
 it was naturally assumed to be equally, if not 
more, important in the early years of the cold war.  Initial planning to meet a future 
threat began in late 1945, proceeding at a slow pace until the Berlin Crisis of 1948 
punctured the leisurely progress of civil defence planning.
9
  That summer, an 
emergency plan was hastily put together,
10
 and over the next twelve months, a Civil 
Defence Act (1948) was passed requiring local authorities to implement civil defence 
measures, and a voluntary Civil Defence Corps was created (1949). The civil defence 
measures of the later 1940s, including evacuation planning, plans for the „due 
functioning‟ of essential industry and the creation of additional port facilities, were 
designed to enable Britain to continue to fight (and supply the Army) in a major 
European war.
11
  In 1948 it was believed that until the mid-1950s the Soviet Union 
would have only a limited number of atomic weapons with which to supplement its 
overwhelmingly conventional methods of air attack; as it became clear the Soviet 
atomic stockpile would far exceed this, the centrality of civil defence began to fracture 
before the original policy could be implemented.  By 1953, although the rearmament 
inspired by the Korean War saw a massive hike in civil defence spending, it was clear 
that the „atomic‟ civil defence as previously envisaged could not hope to save Britain 
from the crippling effects of air attack.  At this point it was believed that in a future war 
an attack on the United Kingdom would kill 1.3 million people and cripple the nation‟s 
infrastructure, thus ending all hope of supplying the BAOR.
12
   
 
Shortly on the heels of this devastating analysis, an even more shocking development 
ensured that „life-saving‟ civil defence on the 1939-45 model was obsolete.  Although in 
scientific terms the first hydrogen bomb was exploded by the United States in 
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November 1952, in terms of its impact on the British cold war state, the hydrogen bomb 
era began with the American Pacific tests between February and April 1954.  The 
enormous power of the weapon, coupled with the discovery of its deadly radioactive 
side effects, triggered something amounting panic in Whitehall and beyond.
13
  To 
countermand the effects of the hydrogen bomb‟s blast and its deadly radiation, an 
influential working party was eventually set up to investigate how civil defence could 
be reconfigured.  Chaired by a Treasury official, William Strath, and staffed by a 
mixture of officials and scientists from the Ministry of Defence and the Home Office, 
their report – the „Strath Report‟ – was delivered in early 1955 and recommended an 
enormous programme to save the United Kingdom in a future war.
14
  Although the 
possibility of saving lives through post-attack rescue was remote, Strath believed that 
through a mixture of evacuation and Treasury-funded domestic shelters, millions could 
be saved out of the twelve millions estimated casualties arising from an attack with just 
ten hydrogen bombs.  Only if Britain committed enormous sums (around £2,000 
million) to these and other „survival‟ measures, such as food and medical stockpiles, 
could the British state hope to emerge through a thermonuclear war intact.
15
 
 
Before Strath had reported, Coventry City Council announced that it would stop all civil 
defence measures as, in the Town Clerk‟s words, „in view of the recent reports in regard 
to the explosion of the hydrogen bomb and its devastating effects… it is a waste of 
public time and money‟.16  The Councillors were attacked in scathing terms by the 
Daily Mail on 8 April 1954, which called them „conceited little men who, because they 
have been elected to a local council, think they have a mandate to run the world‟.17  The 
row was resolved by the Home Secretary, Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, exercising his right 
(enshrined in regulations made under the 1948 Act) to appoint commissioners to 
undertake the Coventry‟s civil defence functions „in the name and at the expense of the 
said Council‟.18  Churchill approved, declaring that the Council should be treated „with 
the utmost censure which the law allows.  What a mean and cowardly gesture for a city 
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to refuse to give humanitarian aid to neighbouring towns in distress, at the same time 
expecting help themselves‟.19 
 
When Strath reported a major political battle took place which demonstrated some of 
the major faults with the British cold war state.  In short, advocates for the „full Strath‟ 
eventually numbered just one: the Home Secretary, Gwilym Lloyd-George.  Shelters 
were simply too expensive (total bill: £1,250 million), and although Lloyd-George 
fought an impressive rearguard action in late 1955 to ensure stockpiling and other 
„survival‟ measures were implemented throughout 1955, he failed to secure even the 
first, and smallest, instalment (£78 million) of his desired £628 million over seven 
years.  Lloyd-George‟s fellow ministers had agreed in principle with the desirability of 
thoroughgoing civil defence measures, but the economic circumstances of the post-1955 
election boom ruled it out.
20
   For example, Strath was endorsed as the basis of war 
planning by the Defence Committee in early 1955,
21
 and even when rejecting his 
stockpiling budget it accepted in principle the need for his seven year plan.
22 
 
 
Despite the hard-fought compromise, there were important strains of opinion forming 
against civil defence, especially in the Ministry of Defence.  For example, Lloyd-
George argued in October 1955 for shelters to be constructed on the grounds that 
without them civilian morale would collapse: there would be little point in „keeping 
forces for the “hot war” if the morale of this country is to collapse and we lose the will 
to fight‟.23  Opinion in Air Ministry, however, questioned how many casualties these 
shelters would avoid in London (the planned shelters, designed to protect against 
fallout, would be quite useless against the blast of the hydrogen bomb), and whether 
they would really improve morale.
24
  The opinion was also growing within the defence 
establishment that any large sums spent on passive defence would eventually have to 
compete with funds spent on the deterrent and conventional forces.
25
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Thus we can see that in many ways civil defence was in an anomalous position in the 
early months of 1956.  Although no real strand of opinion existed within Whitehall 
calling for an end to civil defence measures, the recommendations of the Strath Report 
were in tatters: shelters had been comprehensively rejected and „minimum‟ survival 
measures requested by Lloyd-George had not been met in full.  It was a classic 
compromise, a half-measure.  The whole doctrine of the policy was to save as many 
lives as possible, both before and after the attack, but such a policy was in ruins due to a 
lack of money.  It is not surprising that the forthcoming year saw increasing calls for a 
new conceptualisation of civil defence.  But despite this ambiguity, civil defence 
remained an integral part of the state‟s response to the cold war threat; moreover, it was 
a key part of the public response to that threat.  Since 1945 civil defence had 
continuously been stressed as a part of Britain‟s vital preparations in case of future war; 
the need for voluntary training was pressed after the founding of the Civil Defence 
Corps in 1949, using language and images familiar from the Second World War.
26
  
Since 1953, the annual Defence White Papers had included reassuring paragraphs on 
civil and home defence (for this purpose, they were essentially synonyms) stressing the 
measures which had been taken which would save lives in a future atomic war.  In short, 
the government‟s discourse on nuclear war had included emphasising some public 
protection, and when later in 1957 this promise of protection was seemingly withdrawn, 
or least enormously undermined, there could not fail to be important political and social 
consequences.   
 
 
The Policy Review 1956 
Shortly after the major decisions on home defence had been taken in late 1955 and early 
1956, the Eden Government began a major review to consider what changes could be 
made in British policy, considering the nation‟s economic circumstances and given that 
it was now believe general war would be unlikely due to the destructive power of the 
hydrogen bomb.
27
  Never fully completed because of Suez, the Policy Review‟s (PR) 
attempt at reconciling foreign policy aims with domestic policy and Britain‟s economic 
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weakness (especially in terms of strategy) had important repercussions for the following 
year‟s White Paper, but has failed to receive the attention it deserves.28   It did not seek 
a dramatic reorientation of Britain‟s political or economic strategy, but argued this 
strategy was endangered by the excessive burdens placed upon the economy:  
 
it is clear that since the end of the war we have tried to do too much – 
with the result that we have only rarely been free from the danger of 
economic crisis….  Unless we make substantial reductions in the 
Government‟s claims on the national economy we shall endanger our 
capacity to play an effective role in world affairs.  We must therefore 
concentrate on essentials and reduce other commitments.  Only thus shall 
we be able to find the means to place our economy on a stable basis and 
to counter the new forms of attack with which we are being confronted.
29
 
 
 
Integral to this process was the belief that Britain and the world were at a crucial 
juncture in the cold war: „the hydrogen bomb has transformed the military situation.  It 
has made full-scale war with Russia or China unlikely.  And conventional forces, 
though still of great importance in some situations, have become a relatively less 
important factor in world affairs‟.30  Although couched in terms of needing to meet the 
„political and material‟ challenge of communism threat in the „era of competitive co-
existence‟, PR clearly imagined some sort of post-Geneva moment in which British 
defence commitments could be scaled back without damaging Britain‟s strategic 
position.  Possession of the deterring hydrogen bomb, belief in the lessening importance 
of conventional forces and a parallel increase in the need for inexpensive „political‟ 
initiatives, all seemed to fit nicely with the pressing economic need for cuts.   
 
Although many of the important strategic decisions announced in the 1957 White Paper 
were still to be decided – and the exact levels of manning and spending were painfully 
thrashed out after Macmillan became Prime Minister and Sandys Minister of Defence – 
on a more basic level it was understood that big reductions were needed and that the 
new hydrogen bomb allowed them to be made. Richard Powell, Deputy Secretary of the 
Ministry of Defence at the time, believed that, „there was a feeling [around 1956-67], 
when the impact of nuclear weapons finally broke through, that the nuclear deterrent 
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was not only going to deter global war in Europe, but every kind of military incident‟.31  
Macmillan, Chancellor when PR was meeting, was relieved, noting in his diary that „the 
military are beginning not only to talk about the Hydrogen Bomb strategy but to 
contemplate putting it into effect‟.32 
 
Of more immediate concern for Macmillan was the pressing need for savings of £100 
million in government expenditure.  „The £100 million‟ dominated the domestic 
business of the government throughout the summer months and even before Suez 
diverted Ministerial attention from the review, PR had neglected its longer-term 
strategic aspects and become more concentrated on Macmillan‟s expenditure demands. 
But whereas most of the policy changes implicit in PR‟s initial deliberations had to wait 
until 1957, it had sufficiently set the strategic agenda to see an enormous cut in civil and 
home defence provision.  This cut was demanded by Macmillan on financial grounds, 
and contributed greatly to his £100 million, but it was also acceded to on strategic 
grounds, demonstrating, as we shall see, a deep belief in the deterrent value of the 
nuclear weapon.   
 
Of integral importance was the belief expressed by Eden that „we must now cut our coat 
according to our cloth… there is not much cloth‟ and specifically that „in our defence 
programme generally we are doing too much to guard against the least likely risk, viz. 
the risk of major war‟.33  In response to Macmillan‟s demands, a report on civil and 
home defence was produced by the Sir Walter Monckton, the Minister of Defence.  
Lloyd-George,
34
 the Minister responsible for civil defence, was excluded from the PR 
Committee on the grounds that Monckton was officially responsible for co-ordination of 
all defence measures.  Thus Monckton was able to recommend swingeing cuts in Lloyd-
George‟s budget, reducing „defence expenditure‟ but maintaining his own departmental 
allocation.
35
  In fact Monckton‟s strategy earned him a rebuke by Eden the following 
month, the text of which implied that Monckton was not ensuring a fair allocation of 
resources within the defence budget for home defence and, crucially, he was attempting 
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to deal with the Home Secretary in manner he dealt with the service ministers.
36
 The 
experiment of Ministry of Defence overlordship was scrapped the following year.
37
    
Monkcton‟s proposed PR cuts involved a variety of measures, but mainly rested on 
cutting all stockpiling expenditure, to contribute some £12 million (including some £5 
million already previously  agreed) to „the £100 million‟ of cuts in the current financial 
year.   
 
Monckton also argued that further cuts would follow in future years as home defence 
was radically overhauled.  By discontinuing expenditure „designed to enable us to 
“survive” a war and to “recover”‟, enormous savings could be made.  Monckton‟s only 
caveat was that „our discontinuance of these preparations should not be so abrupt as to 
cause a shock to our allies and our own public‟.  All that should be continued were 
„those home defence preparations the absence of which would be liable to undermine 
the deterrent‟.  These were: measures for the continuity of government and control of 
the population, communications for air defence and for air-raid warning, and the 
maintenance and training of civil defence forces and of military forces allocated to 
home defence.  These three policy strands were needed because without them „all 
central command would come to an end and complete chaos would ensue the moment 
the first bombs fell‟.38  In all, this would allow home defence spending to fall to under 
£30 million in 1957/8 and under £20 million a year thereafter. 
 
When the PR Committee met on 9 June 1956 Monckton‟s new policy was approved, 
and only the abolition of stockpiling raised any concerns.
39
  But hoarding food and 
medical supplies was deemed to involve „expenditure on a scale inappropriate to the 
new assumptions on which our defence policy was to be based‟.  Stockpiling accounted 
for some £383 million of the total £629 million home defence programme agreed in 
principle just six months previously.  Although allowing „this country to be involved in 
global war without adequate stocks would be catastrophic‟, it was considered that „such 
a war would be catastrophic in any case – not only to this country but to the human race 
– and it was unlikely that the presence or absence of stocks would be a material factor in 
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a Government‟s decision on whether to allow this country to become involved in a 
global war‟.40 
 
This abandonment of the traditional conception of home defence as a means to survive 
and recover from a war did not mean the end of the volunteer civil defence forces.  As 
Monckton put it in his original paper, „we must continue to take an active interest in 
civil defence… otherwise the volunteer forces will wither away‟.  Vitally, „our policy 
would not be one of providing a façade, and we must be careful not to think in such 
terms‟.  What Monckton meant was the new conception of home defence – maintenance 
of the deterrent – would have to be explained publicly, and „that within these limits, our 
home defence preparations will be realistic and not a façade‟.41  This could only occur if 
the Government were prepared to announce the adoption of the new rationale and the 
abandonment of the publicly held policy that civil and home defence preparations were 
designed to save lives.  Of course, if the government failed to do this then the revised 
civil defence policy would indeed be a façade, one that would be increasingly difficult 
to maintain.  Herein lies the origins of the controversial passage in the Sandys White 
Paper that there was no adequate defence and the rather less well remembered section 
detailing the continued importance of home defence in the thermonuclear era.   
 
In outlining his strategy, Monckton neatly delineated the fundamental difference in 
doctrine on home defence between the military thinkers in the Ministry of Defence and 
the domestic strategists in the Home Office.  His reasoning was that stockpiling would 
have no real effect and that the basic requirement of home defence was to convince the 
Soviets that the British deterrent was viable.  The continuation of measures he outlined 
above would do this: all else would be unnecessary.   The Home Office view, in stark 
contrast, was that civil defence was required to convince the British public that the 
deterrent was viable: without life-saving measures, „defeatism‟ of the Coventry sort 
could not be discouraged and that only by sustaining and promoting civil defence could 
moderate opinion be encouraged to support the deterrent policy and its implications for 
a future war.  Moreover, there was the opinion that civil defence was fundamentally 
right, that it could save lives and was the only moral option open to the government.  
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This divergence meant that when the Home Office finally had the opportunity to 
comment, on 18 June, a bitter argument ensued.  Lloyd-George had not been consulted 
at all over Monckton‟s paper,42 and when he was, it was in the form of a paper 
suggesting a policy which the Policy Review had in fact already agreed on.
43
  The 
excluded minister reacted angrily to the suggestion that provision be cut so radically, 
especially because he had not been informed of the revised strategic assumptions on 
which the cuts were apparently based.  He fumed: „the fact that the chances of global 
war are receding is not enough to warrant such a disproportionate cut in the expenditure 
that has been previously regarded as an absolute minimum‟. He despaired that the „long 
term plan‟ on which „so much thought was given last winter‟ had been annulled.44   
 
Lloyd-George envisaged the dark consequences of such a cut: it was his belief that the 
voluntary civil defence organisation „would very soon break up of its own accord‟ if its 
work was not placed in the context of a wider, thorough home defence policy of the sort 
being abandoned by Monckton. Such a cut could „be justified only if it is the 
Government‟s considered view that global war can be discounted altogether‟.45  The 
Home Secretary‟s anger was unsurprising.  As he put it, the previous home defence 
policy had been painstakingly put together over the course of many meetings and many 
months, and had settled on a course of providing the bare minimum necessary to enable 
Britain to fight and survive a nuclear war.  Six months later, this carefully constructed 
policy was ripped up in less than a week, by a group he played no part in.   
 
Lloyd-George and Monckton restated their arguments when a Ministerial Committee on 
Home Defence met on 20 June.
46
  In particular, Lloyd-George argued that limiting 
home defence expenditure to £25 million „would make it difficult to convince local 
authorities and the public that the Government attached any serious importance to home 
defence preparations‟.  It was also suggested that the home defence policy envisaged by 
Monckton could not be met with such limited funds.  To reconcile his policy with this 
view, Monckton called for an official report „on the possible bases and levels of 
expenditure on which a coherent home defence policy could be constructed.  In the light 
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of such a report, Ministers could decide which policy to adopt and programmes could 
thereafter be drawn up on the basis of that policy‟.47  Thus the basis of future policy on 
home defence was entrusted to a committee of civil servants chaired by the Cabinet 
Secretary, Sir Norman Brook.  Brook had been present throughout the deliberations of 
the Policy Review meetings, and was more informed than the outcast Lloyd-George on 
the initial decision to cut home defence provision. 
 
Brook‟s snap review of home defence, completed within days, reluctantly upheld 
Monckton‟s new „deterrent-only‟ policy.48  Although strongly guided to support the 
new PR-favoured £25 million limit, with Brook arguing that as the £100 million needed 
for a survival-and-recovery policy was out of the question, an extra £15 million more 
„would largely be money down the drain‟ as it could not hope to achieve real results‟,49 
the Committee reacted strongly to the cut.
50
  It was pointed out that without stockpiles 
of food, medical supplies or fuel, the home defence effort would collapse: no survivors 
could be treated and more would probably die of starvation than from the actual enemy 
attack.
51
  
 
Thus when Brook reported back to the Ministerial Home Defence Committee, he argued 
that if any money over that supplied to the basic policy could be found, it should be 
devoted to food stockpiling on the grounds of maintaining the deterrent.  Ministers were 
informed that officials believed expenditure of less than £25 million was unfeasible, and 
that if more could be found stockpiling should be continued, but that the Monckton 
policy could proceed at a cost of between £25-30 million a year.
52
  Ministers were 
warned, however, of the risks such a policy entailed. It would be difficult „to reinstate 
quickly any insurance against the failure of the deterrent‟.  Also, Brook made it clear 
„that the absence of an insurance against the failure of the deterrent could not be 
concealed.  In particular, although no information about the size of food stocks is made 
public, the fact that they were being run down would become widely known‟.53 
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Lloyd-George‟s intervention appeared, by the end of June 1956, to have secured an 
extra few million pounds for his cherished civil defence policy, but even a figure of 
£25-30 million meant the end of any notion of „surviving‟ and „recovering‟ from a 
nuclear war.  Although agreement on this had been forged, there remained a deep and 
underlying disagreement about the worth of key home defence measures that was not 
resolved until the next decade.  Over „survival‟ measures, Lloyd-George, and indeed 
much of Whitehall, felt a degree of resentment that the basic doctrine of home defence 
had been overturned so quickly and on financial grounds.  The Home Office, for 
example, was not convinced that survival-and-recovery was impossible or a waste of 
resources.  This had important implications for the debate over the „deterrent‟ value of 
home defence.  Monckton and the Ministry of Defence had taken a very narrow view of 
the issue: only those policies which actively helped the use of the military deterrent 
were necessary.  The Home Office, on the other hand, believed that the continuation of 
„survival‟ measures such as stockpiling food and medical supplies were necessary to 
maintain the fiction of post-attack preparedness, thus encouraging the belief – both at 
home and abroad – in British determination to resist aggression, even at the risk of all-
out nuclear war.   
 
These contradictions were not resolved in the summer of 1956, but short-term 
acquiescence was secured partly by the threat of an even bigger cut.  Macmillan, on 12 
July, weighed in by arguing that spending should be capped at £15 million.
54
  This 
would mean standing down the voluntary civil defence services „and have nothing 
locally except a nucleus organisation which could be expanded – along with other 
preparations – if the risk of global war came above the horizon‟.  Macmillan believed 
„that there is sufficient in this programme to show the people of this country and any 
potential enemies abroad that we are prepared to face a hydrogen bomb attack in the 
unlikely contingency of global war‟.55  Such a further cut on this scale was opposed by 
Brook when he briefed Eden before PR met the following day.
56
  Brook reminded the 
Prime Minister that the Committee had „agreed that we should maintain the minimum 
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element of home defence required to support the deterrent‟, and that this minimum level 
had been outlined by Monckton and fleshed out by officials and amounted to spending 
about £25 million a year.  Macmillan‟s proposal to stand down the Civil Defence 
Services „would have to be justified on the basis that we can see no prospect of an 
attack on this country for many years to come.  It would not be consistent with our 
defence policy generally‟.  It would „at least appear to undermine the deterrent‟, as well 
as being difficult to defend publicly; „it would involve admitting Coventry was right‟57 
– a shrewd comment by Brook, given the controversy caused by Coventry‟s actions in 
1954.   
 
When PR met on 13 July, Macmillan‟s proposal was savaged by Monckton and Lloyd-
George (invited for the first time).  Monckton explained: „though the risk of global war 
in the near future might be remote, the possibility of global war could not be ruled out 
altogether‟, and the new policy maintained „a sufficient level of defence preparations to 
ensure that the deterrent could operate and that the Russians were not led to believe that 
they could destroy this country in one attack without being destroyed themselves‟.58  
Moreover, „if the Civil Defence Services were stood down it would be impossible to 
conceal the fact, which would be likely to have a disturbing effect‟ both on public 
opinion and on Britain‟s allies‟.59  Lloyd-George, converted to Monckton‟s plan out of 
the necessity of defending civil defence from Macmillan‟s even more devastating cuts, 
now argued that £25-30 million a year was „the lowest level on which it would be 
possible to maintain a successful home defence programme‟.  Moreover, the steady 
decline in civil defence spending since 1954 had left the „growing impression that the 
Government had accepted that nothing could be done about civil defence in global war.  
There was a risk that a defeatist attitude might spread throughout the country‟.60   
 
Monckton‟s triumph resulted in a three-year plan based on this policy being completed 
in December.
61
  When commenting on the plan, Brook informed the Cabinet in January 
1957 that the officials most closely involved with civil defence had stressed „the 
difficulty of defending a home defence programme which makes no significant 
                                                 
57
 Ibid. 
58
 NA, CAB 134/1315.  PR(56)6
th
 Meeting, 13.7.1956. 
59
 Ibid. 
60
 Ibid. 
61
 NA, CAB 134/1207.  C(O)D(56)23 (Final), „Defence Expenditure by Civil Departments, 1957/58-
1959/60‟, Report by the Official Committee on Civil Defence, 30.10.1956. 
 16 
provision for the survival of the country in the event of nuclear attack‟.62  They also 
suggested „that it might be easier to justify this programme by reference to the general 
financial and economic conditions than by reference to any revised appreciation of the 
risk of global war‟.63  It was followed up by a remarkable broadside by Lloyd-George.  
The new policy, he argued in his last Cabinet paper two days before he left the Cabinet 
alongside the broken Eden, would cause people to conclude that „the real reason for the 
reduction is not so much the reduced risk of war as a Government decision that civil 
defence preparations are of little value‟.64   He believed that if this view became 
widespread existing civil defence preparations would be jeopardised, thus undermining 
the deterrent.  Evoking the „widespread defeatism‟ felt after knowledge of the hydrogen 
bomb became public, Lloyd-George warned that only „reiterated assurances that the 
Government was still convinced of the value of civil defence‟ could avert a calamitous 
collapse of confidence within civil defence and discourage local authorities following 
the example of Coventry and abandoning civil defence.
65
  This was in stark contrast to 
Monckton‟s argument in PR that support for the deterrent would be secured only by 
boldly stating that civil defence cuts were warranted by the decreased likelihood of 
global war and the fact that measures existed not to save lives, but to maintain the 
deterrent.    
 
 
The White Paper and After 
After Macmillan became Prime Minister, the defence review began in earnest, although 
in reality the months leading up to the publishing of the White Paper in April 1957 
should be seen as the frenetic end to a long period of continuous review.  In these 
discussions civil defence was understandably pushed to the back of people‟s minds as 
the issues of conscription, Fighter Command and others were thrashed out.   However, 
as the White Paper wound its elephantine way around Whitehall throughout March 
1957, the new Home Secretary, „Rab‟ Butler, became concerned at the treatment of civil 
defence in the new document.  His focus was on two sections; although his official 
Ministerial interest was restricted to the section on „Civil Defence‟, he also scrutinised 
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the section on the „Nuclear Deterrent‟ as its discussion of the scale and nature of attack 
would naturally define how the other paragraphs were received.  The changing 
phraseology of the White Paper in the first spring of Macmillan‟s premiership illustrates 
how civil defence was first conceived by the Ministry of Defence, how Butler‟s 
concerns were met and a compromise reached, and finally how the importance of civil 
defence was given greater prominence but failed to lessen the impact of more radical 
elements of the White Paper.   
   
When the full Cabinet first received a draft of the White Paper on 15 March 1957, it 
treated civil defence in the manner in which Monckton had analysed it the previous 
summer.  Namely, it was firmly sublimated within the deterrent posture, as indeed was 
almost everything else in the document.  For example, the first paragraphs on the 
deterrent ran: 
 
Though the Hunters and Javelins of the Royal Air Force would, in the 
event of war with Russia, be able to take a substantial toll of Soviet 
Bombers, a proportion would inevitably get through.  Even if it were 
only a dozen, they could, with hydrogen bombs, inflict widespread 
devastation and might well blot out a large part of the population of the 
big cities.  It must be frankly recognised that fighters cannot give the 
country as a whole any effective protection against the catastrophic 
consequences of nuclear attack. 
  Clearly therefore the central aim must be to prevent war rather than to 
prepare for it.  In present circumstances the only way to deter nuclear 
aggression is to possess the means of retaliating in time.
66
 
 
 
Thus we can see the origins of the infamous „no adequate defence‟ passage lay in an 
attempt to explain the cutting back of Fighter Command by expounding the new 
deterrent strategy.  Similarly, civil defence was rather tersely explained in the following 
way:  
 
Passive preparations for nuclear war must take second place to active 
measures to prevent war; and expenditure on civil defence must as far as 
possible be curtailed. Nevertheless, plans must be made to enable 
organised society to survive. 
  The civil defence services will be maintained, and will be supplied with 
adequate equipment for training.  The work of strengthening essential 
communications will continue.  Research and planning will go forward.
 67
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The lack of life-saving measures is implicit, and no-one could remain under the 
impression that civil defence was considered to be vital aspect of the state‟s cold war 
stance.  Understandably, one Cabinet critic (presumably Butler as the Minister 
responsible), stated that „the treatment of civil defence… would need further 
consideration, particularly in the light of the statement that the great cities could not at 
present be defended against nuclear attack‟.68   
 
When the next draft appeared eleven days later, the deterrent section had been amended; 
it now read: „it must be frankly recognised that there is at present no means of 
protecting the people of Britain against the catastrophic consequences of an attack with 
nuclear weapons….  This grim fact makes it more than ever clear that the overriding 
consideration in all military planning must be to prevent war rather than to prepare for 
it‟.69  These omissions changed the sense of the White Paper: whereas before it argued 
that fighters could not stop bombers delivering their payloads, it now suggested that 
there was no defence at all from nuclear weapons; whereas before the deterrent strategy 
(needed to stop bombs being delivered) could have been reconciled with civil defence 
(needed in case deterrence failed), now the need for civil defence seemed to be 
contradicted.  Although in the published version the key sentence was amended slightly, 
this had no impact on the overall impression produced by the contrasting sections. 
 
The rolling series of amendments to the civil defence section also had important 
consequences. Although the original draft may have lacked nuance, it at least made it 
absolutely clear that there was a strategic rationale behind the cuts in provision, and that 
Britain‟s ability „to deter nuclear aggression‟ made civil defence much less important.   
By the final version of the White Paper this link between civil defence and the deterrent 
had been lessened as much as the policy‟s continued worth had been reiterated.  
Paragraph 21 of the published version read: „While available resources should as far as 
possible be concentrated on building up an active deterrent, it would be wrong not to 
take some precautions to minimise the effects of nuclear attack, should the deterrent fail 
to prevent war.  Civil Defence must accordingly play an essential part in the defence 
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plan‟.  There followed a brief list of measures which would „provide a framework for 
expansion, should that later be necessary‟.70 
 
Hence the amendments to the original draft had the result of simultaneously: a) 
undermining the case for civil defence by suggesting that nothing could help the 
population in a nuclear war; and b) undermining the case for deterrent by stressing the 
continued need for civil defence in case it failed.  In the original draft, the possibility of 
the deterrent failing was barely raised, and what we can see in the transition from first to 
final draft is the retreat of the „Moncktonian‟ vision of civil defence from its 1956 
victory, and advance from the brink of complete defeat of the traditional „Gwilymian‟ 
view – at least in terms of statements in the White Paper.  In actuality, of course, civil 
defence had been severely curtailed, but the original idea expressed within PR was for 
the sharp decline in civil defence spending to be explained in strategic terms, as 
evidenced in the original draft of the Sandys Paper.  However, when the White Paper 
was published, the emphasis on the deterrent dominated public discourse on the 
document; no discussion of civil defence lessened it.  Nor did the redrafting of the civil 
defence sections seem to impinge on the public mind.  This is because much more was 
made of the „no adequate defence‟ statement.   
 
No amount of rephrasing of the civil defence paragraphs would have replaced the 
impression that the government thought civil defence next to useless.  In effect the 
consequences of the White Paper were those Lloyd-George had most feared: 
contemporary observers could not have avoided the conclusion drawn by Alistair 
Horne, Macmillan‟s official biography, some twenty-two years later: „home defence 
was slashed to the bone – on the pessimistic, or realistic, assumption that there could be 
no effective protection for the civil population on the dreadful power of the new H-
Bomb‟.71  This view certainly became widespread.  Although the Government had 
dressed the language of the White Paper partly to avoid such an impression, the public, 
as Peter Hennessy has put it, „could read White Papers and absorb the essential thinking 
behind them‟.72 
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The initial press reaction was relatively muted, with newspapers understandably more 
concerned with the defence cuts and the end of conscription.  The editorial of the Daily 
Mail, in summarising the White Paper‟s rationale, echoed Stanley Baldwin‟s famous 
comment made a quarter of century before: „the H-bomber will always get through‟.73  
Neither the Times nor the Daily Telegraph mentioned „the admission‟ outside of 
summaries of the document.  The Manchester Guardian had it in bold type on the front 
page,
74
 but its leader said „this is a bold statement, but it will only come as a shock to 
those who have been cherishing illusions dangerous to themselves‟.75  Within days of 
the publication of the White Paper in April, however, St Pancras Borough Council 
decided to follow the example of Coventry in 1954 and renounce civil defence.  The 
row erupted when the Council‟s General Purposes Committee recommended that civil 
defence should be stopped because, the Town Clerk informed the Home Office, „in 
view of the Government‟s admission in the recent White Paper that there is no real 
defence against atomic and hydrogen bomb warfare, we are of the opinion that to 
continue with civil defence is a complete waste of money‟.76   
 
An enraged Butler wrote to Sandys the day the St Pancras decision made the evening 
papers (15 April), informing in his colleague that he had been concerned „at the 
construction that had been placed on [the crucial „no defence‟ sentence] and its possible 
effect on the public‟.  He continued: „I had hoped that the wording we agreed for the 
paragraphs dealing with civil defence would have been sufficient to safeguard the 
position, but even in the short time since the publication of the White Paper, it has 
become increasingly clear that this is not sufficient‟. St Pancras was „the most extreme 
example of this‟.  What was more, the Metropolitan Borough called on other local 
authorities to do the same and impress upon the Government „the urgency of abolishing 
all atomic and hydrogen bombs as the only means of abolishing the wholesale slaughter 
of people in future wars‟.77  Desperate to restrict the malign influence of the 
„Communist-controlled‟ council,78 Butler implored Sandys to stress the validity of civil 
defence and quash the „indefensible‟ current of argument in the next day‟s Commons 
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defence debate; but although Sandys added a brief section on civil defence to his 
speech, he merely echoed the White Paper and failed to adequately expound civil 
defence.  He did at least stress that „the nation‟s available resources should be 
concentrated not on preparations to wage war so much as on trying to prevent this 
catastrophe from ever happening‟,79 but this hardly suited Butler‟s purpose. 
 
Butler himself swiftly moved to crush the St Pancras „rebellion‟ in order to stop the 
„embarrassment‟ of other local authorities following suit.80  But although the issue of St 
Pancras Council‟s non-compliance was resolved swiftly, with a Commissioner being 
appointed to undertake the Council‟s civil defence functions,81 it was an embarrassing 
episode which generated a deal of adverse publicity for the Government‟s defence 
policy.  Moreover, it seemed to immediately prove the validity of Home Office 
concerns regarding support for the government‟s defence policy.  Although a look at the 
press reaction should have placated the Home Secretary, as the Daily Telegraph and the 
News Chronicle gave ample space to critics of the St Pancras move,
82
  it was a grim 
warning of the future, as opponents of the Conservative Government‟s nuclear policy 
made use of its own published information to launch attacks – especially that single 
sentence in the Sandys White Paper.  It recurred, in mutated form, as a terrible coda 
damning the Government‟s policy, reaching its apotheosis early in 1958 when the 
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament was formed in London. 
 
It is standard for historians of the nuclear disarmament movement to stress the 
importance of the Sandys White Paper in inspiring the groundswell of opinion which 
occurred in 1957-58.
83
  The origins of CND are complex - the movement coalesced 
from other groups, especially those campaigning against nuclear testing.  The 1957 
White Paper was one of two key events.  By stressing Britain‟s adherence to a deterrent 
strategy, it made British use of hydrogen bombs seem much more likely; also, 
rationalising nuclear weapons and seeking to integrate them with „normal‟ weapons 
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seemed immoral to some. The second key event was Nye Bevan‟s famous „emotional 
spasm‟ speech at that year‟s Labour Conference.84  By ruling out unilateralism Bevan 
essentially „disenfranchised‟ its supporters – without the Labour Party, the disarmers 
had to stand alone and speak for themselves.  What is not so well understood was the 
importance of the civil defence debate in allowing opponents of the Government‟s 
nuclear policy to frame their criticisms.  In an obvious way, for the councillors of St 
Pancras (or Coventry), stopping local civil defence measures was the only way of 
striking at the Government.  By flagging its „pointlessness‟, they were highlighting the 
contradictions in the Government‟s civil defence policy, questioning the worth of 
nuclear weapons if they presaged total destruction for all. Early CND propaganda did 
much the same thing. For example, a 1958 pamphlet by unilateralist historian A.J.P. 
Taylor made much of the admission: „there is no defence against the H-bomb, according 
to the Minster of Defence.  No preparation can be made to secure the civilian 
population.  And it is official policy that none can be made‟.85  A major element of 
CND‟s success, in historian Meredith Veldman‟s words, „was to convince ordinary 
individuals that they knew better than the experts, that the almost instinctive emotional 
revulsion against the idea of nuclear war should be trusted as much as or more so than 
any strategic calculations‟.86  Using the White Paper‟s admission as a didactic tool 
allowed the disarmers to promote their „populist moralism‟,87 ridiculing politicians in 
the process.  From St Pancras to early CND, the Sandys White Paper‟s admission that 
the bomber will always get through was turned into an admission that civil defence was 
useless and that nuclear exchange would cause utter annihilation, which of course 
underpinned CND‟s fundamental case that the bomb was both immoral and insane.88  
 
The changes to home defence policy during the 1955-57 period sought to make civil 
defence more relevant and cost-effective in the new thermonuclear ear.  Gone were 
expensive measures and in came the rhetoric of „insurance‟ and deterrence.  In terms of 
actual saving of lives, civil defence in the years after Sandys rested on the idea of self-
help, aided by a warning system which would at least give the public the chance of 
                                                 
84
 „Unilateral ban on nuclear weapons rejected‟, The Times, 4.10.1957. 
85
 A.J.P. Taylor, The Deterrent Myth, (London: CND, 1958), p.1. 
86
 M. Veldman, Fantasy, the Bomb, and the Greening of Britain: Romantic Protest, 1945-80, (Cambridge 
UP, 1994), p.202. 
87
 Taylor, Against the Bomb, p.43. 
88
 For the Government‟s limited attempt to answer the disarmers‟ criticisms and promote civil defence see 
Grant, „Civil Defence Policy‟. 
 23 
survival.  In the areas of peripheral damage, it was hoped, the Civil Defence Corps 
would have a rescue role.  Two key elements in this new doctrine were the Royal 
Observer Corps (ROC), and the new United Kingdom Warning and Monitoring 
Organisation, the successor to the Air Raid Warning Organisation.   The ROC were 
given the role of monitoring fallout during a hydrogen bomb attack – an activity very 
different from the aeroplane spotting the ROC enthusiasts had trained, and signed up, 
for.
89
   This role, however, was controversial, with some volunteers resigning and the 
Air Ministry becoming concerned about a crisis of recruitment.
90
  Although volunteers 
were seemingly concerned with the ROC „losing its identity and becoming a remote off-
shoot of the Civil Defence Corps‟,91 without its new civil defence role, the Royal 
Observer Corps would have been left strategically and tactically obsolete by the end of 
the decades.  The warning organisation, which had been given the role of providing the 
public with warnings in 1956,
92
 was restructured to take into account the ROC‟s new 
role.  Although its new headquarters were part of the Home Office, the ROC remained 
institutionally part of the Air Ministry.  In 1959, in the midst of a row about paying for 
the ROC, both the Air Minsitry and the Home Office recognised that although only 290 
out of 1,550 ROC posts were needed for the purposed of identifying low-flying 
aeroplanes, the ROC needed to maintain its traditional link with RAF to avoid 
destroying its morale.
93
   
 
The importance of the new warning system in saving lives was outlined in a 1959 Home 
Office pamphlet,
94
 but little else was said about civil defence in the years following 
Sandys.  An illustrative case was provided by the intervention of Harold Macmillan, 
who in September 1958 was dissatisfied with civil defence spending concentrating on 
the Civil Defence Corps when it clearly would not save many lives.
95
  When the 
possibility of scrapping the Corps was raised, however, the Defence Committee decided 
it was safer to do nothing, because „any change in the existing policy, whether directed 
to expanding or curtailing the limited preparations already being made, would be liable 
to attract attention and so to provoke discussion of an issue to which public opinion 
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appeared at present to be remarkably indifferent‟. Instead, the government would 
continue to „acquiesce‟ in the policy‟s „fundamental illogicality… realising that its main 
purpose was to maintain the morale of the population rather than to provide them with 
any effective protection against nuclear attack‟.96  This belief that civil defence should 
be left well alone, and that the Corps needed to continue for morale rather than life-
saving purposes, was upheld during a thoroughgoing review of civil defence which 
lasted for much 1960.
97
  In this sense, the compromise policy thrashed out in 1956 and 
enshrined in Sandys determined the civil defence agenda until well into 1960s.  
 
Conclusion 
The home defence paradigm of the Sandys White Paper has been an ill-understood 
element of British defence history.  Key paragraphs from the document had a major 
impact on British society and on public perceptions of British nuclear policy.  Also, the 
origins of those paragraphs lie in a fiercely contested Whitehall debate concerning the 
necessity of home defence measures in the thermonuclear age. The wider strategic 
decisions made in the course of 1956 seemed to allow the cuts in home defence 
provision which economic circumstances made so desirable.  The civil defence portion 
of the White Paper‟s savings was crucial.  Overall, only £78 million was reduced from 
the 1956/57 figures: home defence alone was reduced by more than £22 million on the 
previous year.  Yet justifying that saving proved contentious, with the Minister of 
Defence arguing for admitting that home defence served no other role than supporting 
the deterrent and that „survival‟ measures had been abandoned (hence the saving); the 
Home Secretary, on the other hand, counselled that such an argument would encourage 
„defeatism‟ and invite criticism, instead suggesting maintaining the fiction of survival 
measures and justifying reductions on economic grounds (thus allowing the 
Government to continue to „encourage‟ civil defence).  In the final paper, a mixed 
approach was taken, stressing the need for home defence but also admitting that there 
was no real prospect of protection.  Unsurprisingly, one effect of the Paper was the 
long-term opprobrium of the nuclear disarmers, as predicted by Gwilym Lloyd-George. 
 
Sandys was an important document in the history of civil and home defence, but civil 
and home defence was also of vital importance in the shaping, reception and legacy of 
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the White Paper itself.   As soon as it was published, criticism of the Government‟s new 
deterrent policy began in the form of attacks on the lack of civil defence preparations, or 
rather their worthlessness.  Civil defence was the entry point for critics of the new 
strategy as its apparent absence demonstrated the flaws in the plan: any use of Britain‟s 
„deterrent‟ would bring automatic and utter destruction.  In vain the Government 
protested that civil defence remained a key policy, but the lack of real belief in the 
measures within Whitehall was palpable.  Perhaps the most famous sentence ever to 
appear in a Defence White Paper was routinely misquoted – and always quoted out of 
context – but it did appear to sum up the spirit of the White Paper and the Government‟s 
attitude to civil defence as thrashed out in 1956.  In this sense, Gwilym Lloyd-George 
was right and the reality of the government‟s thinking on civil defence would become 
widely understood.  Successive Ministers of Defence, however, were also proved 
correct in the sense that disarmament never came close to becoming a majority opinion 
amongst the British public and that once explained, it seem, the deterrent strategy was 
understood and supported.   
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